From
Community Standards to an Ethical Position
Is Animal Experimentation Justified?
Table of Contents
1.
Introduction
1.1. Why Community Standards?
1.2. Historical Perspective
1.3. The Current Debate
2.
Methods
2.1. Facts
2.2. Values
2.3. Practical
2.4. Logic
3.
Premises
3.1. Facts
3.2. Values
Inherent
Rights
Principle of Equal
Consideration
Public Opinions
The Law
3.3. Practical Questions
4. Logic
4.1. Rights versus Welfare
4.2. Rights and Protection
4.3. Rights and Obligation
4.4. The Able-to-Assert Argument
4.5. The Kind Argument
4.6. The Kinship Argument
4.7. Criteria Based on Relevant Attributes
4.8. Equality
4.9. Inherent Rights
4.10. Practical Questions
5.
Conclusion
5.1. Is Animal Experimentation Justified
5.2. Justifications for the Use of Animals in Research
6. Summary
Appendix
– Virginia Anti-Cruelty Law
References
1.
Introduction
The problems in the use of nonhuman animals in experiments can be
gleaned from the following three quotes. The first is by Adrian R.
Morrison; in a lecture on the use of animals in science, he stated that
“we are a species
unique in our cognitive abilities. . . I think it follows that we owe
it to our fellow man to alleviate pain and misery through biomedical
research” (17).
This view justifies animal use in biomedical research by its benefits
to human for the reason that humans are superior. One the other hand,
Peter Singer, in his response to Richard R. Vance’s 1993
article in JAMA, contended that “one
cannot justify our present assumption that all human beings simply by
virtue of their species membership, posses a moral status superior to
that of any nonhuman animal”
(28).
The benefits to human and the exploitation of nonhuman animals
(hereafter, animals) create a moral dilemma which we should not
overlook. Another dilemma is reflected in a statement in a 1995
handbook of laboratory animal management and welfare, “the
justification for using the animal depends on it being different from
the human, while the validity of the results obtained depends on the
similarity of the animals and their response to those of the human”
(31).
This observation highlights the conflict between moral judgment and
scientific validity in animal research.
Based on my observations and personal experience, even ardent animal
advocates understand the benefits, and its accompanying dilemma, in
using animals in biomedical research. Often it is their last hurdle in
rejecting animal exploitation in general.
I shall explore the moral dilemma in animal experimentation and arrive
at an ethical position based on our community standards.
1.1. Why Community Standards?
The debate on animal experimentation invariably starts with a premise
based on whether animals have rights. If they are presupposed to have
rights, the debate will focus on whether the quality of their rights
precludes them from being used in research; otherwise, without the
presumption of rights, the debate will focus on our degree of
obligation to their welfare. In order to avoid being mired in the
discussion of moral theories of rights, and their validity, and
detailed utilitarian analysis, I shall take the relativistic approach
by limiting the premise for my eventual position to current community
standards where the frame of reference of the debate is readily
available.
1.2. Historical Perspective
Although Claude Bernard (1813-1878), who was widely considered to be
the father of experimental physiology, instituted the paradigm of
methodical animal use in biomedicine (14),
the general use of animals and its debate dates back to antiquity.
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)
wrote in Politics
of the importance of the soul over the body and it as the justification
for a caste system where a man is superior to his wife, and masters
over animals and slaves “for
both their bodies minister to the need of life"
(23).
Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), a theologian and philosophy well
known for his commentaries of Aristotle’s works, wrote in his
Summa Theologica that
“according to the
divine ordinance the life of animals and plants is preserved not for
themselves but for men”.
He also stated that animals, being irrational creatures, cannot form
friendship without which happiness cannot be attained; and without
happiness charity is impossible; “therefore
we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational creature”
(23).
French Philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) in his Discourse on Method
focused on the lack of language ability of animals as the justification
for their use. He believed that animals are automata because they do
not speak and that speech is the only certain sign of thought (23).
Voltaire (1694-1778) in his reply to Descartes rejected the assertion
that animals are machines. He asked his readers to judge the sentience
of animals not by their speech but by observing their actions
– their ability to learn, to cry and their friendship with
humans (23).
German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), a deontologist who
whereas believes that human must not treat other humans as means to
their end, believes that animals are “not
self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end”
and that end is the interest of man. As a result, our duties to animals
are indirect, rather than direct, and that the value of animals is in
their service to men. He held that we must practice kindness to
animals, for “he who
is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealing with men”
(23).
English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), one of the founders of
utilitarianism, advocated legal rights for animals in The Principle of Morals
and Legislation (1789); he
recognized the parallel between the exploitation of slaves and animals,
and the irrelevance of the criteria use to justify such exploitation.
He declared that “the
question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they
suffer?” (23)
The
idea that social contracts form the basis of rights has been in
existence since Plato. The problem is that it is not bound by
elementary justice; only the parties who participated in the contract
have moral rights and those that they exclude do not. John Rawls
(1921-2002) in his A Theory of
Justice
set forth an interpretation of contractarianism (Rawlsian) which aimed
to remove the discriminatory element of simple contractarianism, such
as racial discrimination. He held that when we agree on a contract we
must be blinded to the personal characteristics that make the
contractors different, which he called a “veil
of ignorance”.
However, according to Rawls, there is a requirement the must be met by
the contractors; it is the sense of justice, which in effect eliminates
animals from our moral community (7,
24).
As we have seen, for over 2000 years obstacles were erected to exclude
animals from having moral-standings, be it the soul, language, reason,
fellowship, self-consciousness or the sense of justice.
1.3. The Current Debate
The modern animal debate started in the 1975 with Peter
Singer’s seminal work, Animal
Liberation (26),
where he took a preference-utilitarian perspective. He argued that in
assessing the consequence of our actions affecting animals, the
interest of the animals must be taken into account; that we must accord
equal interest to equal consideration without species bias. However,
humans consider themselves to have a superior moral status than
animals, thus devaluing their interests. He called such attitude Speciesism.
Utilitarian arguments advocating the use of animals in research is
represented by R. G. Frey (11).
Although he rejects the liberation of animals, he believes that animals
have moral-standing because pain and suffering counts morally, and that
life has some value. However, he argues that not all lives, including
human lives, have the same value and that a life has value only if it
has quality. He concludes that certain humans as well as animals may be
used in experimentation.
Tom Regan, on the other hand, is an abolitionist who rejects the
utilitarian approach in ethical arguments in general and its use in
animal advocacy in particular. He takes the deontological approach and
argues that one must respect an individual’s inherent rights;
one may not use the holder of such rights merely as means for public
interest. He introduces the concept of the subject-of-a-life;
any animal that is a subject-of-a-life has inherent right and thus must
not be use as instrument of experimentation (7,
21
and 24).
Carl Cohen entered the animal debate in 1986 advocating the use of
animals in research in an article that appeared in The
New England Journal of Medicine
(6). Like Regan, Cohen recognizes the importance of
inherent right in
the debate in animal experimentation. He believes that if animals have
rights, then we must not use them in experiment; however he argues that
animals do not and cannot have rights (6,
7).
From
the legal perspective Steven M. Wise advocates legal right for animals (29).
He reported on researches in the treatment and cognitive abilities of
nonhuman primates. Based on the results, he advocates the assignment of
autonomy values to species of animals as a framework to provide animals
assess to our justice system (30).
Legal scholar and animal rights advocate, Gary Francione coined the
term moral schizophrenia in describing the inconsistent nature of our
attitude towards animals. He argues that our legal system is
ineffective in protecting them as long as they are considered property
and merely as the means to human ends (8).
He is an animal rightist who criticizes today’s animal
welfare movement, which he called the “new
welfarism”, as counterproductive (9).
Instead, he believes that animals has negative rights
— such as the right to be left alone — and calls for the
eradication of their
property status (10).
Lewis Petrinovich took a sociobiological approach and applies
evolutionary principles to reject the positions of Peter Singer and Tom
Regan, and to justify the use of animals, including in research (19).
2.
Methods
In order to arrive at an ethical position on the use of animals in
research, I consider four aspects in the argument. This first three
are premises that I shall use in reaching a logical conclusion.
2.1. Facts
Empirical data and scientific findings make up one set of premises in
my position. They are considered facts and will not be elaborated
further.
2.2. Values
Our values are evident from our history, our public opinions and our
laws. They are the basis of our community standards.
2.3. Practical Questions
I shall also consider as premises the benefit and harm of animal
experimentation to humans.
2.4. Logic
From the above premises, I shall logically conclude with an ethical
position on the use of animals as instrument in research.
3.
Premises
In this section I list the premises used in the arguments. Those based
on community standards are community values, public opinions and laws.
3.1. Facts
I shall make several assertions here without further discussion or
elaboration; they are based on scientific findings and are generally
accepted as facts. Supported by mounting evidence and public opinions,
animals have the ability to feel pain and to suffer. They have an
interest in their physical security, which includes their inclination
for life, the avoidance of pain and suffering and their aversion to
confinement. Other current findings, which are not essential in
reaching the final position, are the presence of cognition and emotion,
etc, in animals.
Another category of facts are the body of data obtained from public
opinion polls, which is
discussed in the following section.
3.2. Values
Our values are the basis for our community standards. Although religion
and tradition are important elements of our values and have been used
to argue positions in animal use (22),
they are not explicitly considered here. Whereas religion and tradition
play a key role in shaping our opinions, they are implicit in our
concept of rights, public opinions and the law, as well as individual
moral judgments.
Inherent Rights
Our value system places emphasis on rights. According to Bernard E.
Rollins, “rights are
a protection for the individual against the general welfare”;
he elaborates and characterizes a right as “a
safeguard of the moral status of the individual and his human nature or
telos against the pressures of social convenience and general welfare
that might otherwise tend to submerge his individuality and crucial
interests” (25).
Some rights are bestowed upon an individual by virtue of its membership
in a community; for example, civil rights. Inherent rights, on the
other hand are possessed by the individual by virtue of the
individual’s existence. It is generally agreed that inherent
rights are the rights of life, bodily integrity and liberty. Liberty
refers to the right not to be used merely as means to the end of
another individual or the public; liberty includes freedom from slavery
or confinement. These rights guarantee the most basic interest, the
physical security, of their holder. I shall use this definition as one
of my premises.
Autonomy, or self-directing freedom, is not possible without inherent
rights. An individual being used merely as a means cannot make choices
freely.
What is evident of our inherent rights? In the United States, it is
guaranteed in the Declaration of Independence: “We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”.
Countless high court rulings have affirmed this right regardless of
physical or mental capacity; a 1992 Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled
that “cognitive
ability is not a prerequisite for enjoying basic liberties”.
Post WWII treaties, agreements and resolutions declare inherent
dignity, fundamental freedom and inalienable rights (29).
Principle of Equal
Consideration
Another important element of our value system is the principle of equal
consideration; it requires that likes must be treated alike. The
criterion for unequal treatment must be morally relevant; that is, the
criterion used to justify a different treatment must be based on
attributes common to both parties and relevant to the issue at hand.
This principle is the basis for our opposition to racism, sexism,
heterosexism, ageism, ableism, etc, which uses morally irrelevant
criterion of group membership to justify exclusion.
Public Opinions
In a widely cited 1995 Associates Press survey, when American
respondents were presented with the statement: “Some
people say an animal's right to live free of suffering should be just
as important as a person's right to live free of suffering”,
38% of them agrees with it strongly and 29% agrees with it somewhat.
When asked the same respondents their opinion on the use of animals to
test medical treatment, 8% thinks that it is always right while 62%
thinks that it is sometimes rights (Figure 1)
(2).
Other than some exceptions for special demographic groups, similar
results were obtained across many polls (3).
The polls also suggest that opinions on the use of animals vary
depending on the type of research done, the species use and the nature
of ownership (Figures 2,
3,
4)
(2,
3,
20).
From these data, I conclude that the public believes that animals have
some rights, but the nature and quality of right is not specific,
except that they should be free of suffering. This attitude towards
animals
will be one of our premises. I also note that under some circumstances,
the public allows the use of animals in medical research.
The Law
The Animal Welfare Act of 1966
was intended to stop the theft of dogs
and cats for experimentation. It “prohibits
the use of animals if alternatives are feasible”;
it requires that “pain
be minimized and alternatives considered”;
however, it forbids interference in the “the
design, outlines, or guidelines of actual research or experimentation”
(13).
Most state anticruelty laws acknowledge that animals have certain
rights: “The right
to nourishment and adequate living condition . . . the right to
protection from abandonment . . . the right to protection from
poisoning . . . the right to humane transportation”,
etc (13).
Yet, a number of states include in such laws provisions that exempt
such protections for experimentation and for cases where the use is
necessary. See appendix A for the Virginia statute (1).
The third aspect is the property status of animals; if it is not stated
explicitly by statute, it is implemented in practice by court rulings.
As a result, in many cases animal can be used as means when necessary
regardless of its welfare, as determined by the owner; the enforcement
of animal protection is based on wastefulness of their use as
instruments (8).
If an animal is wild or is a runaway, the community owns it
collectively.
3.3. Practical Questions
Reports of biomedical breakthroughs using animals are numerous. Animal
experimentation is instrumental in the development of vaccines, in drug
testing, in understanding and developing treatments for diseases such
neurodegenerative disorders, in xenografts and in basic sciences.
There are also reports of harms caused by the use of animals in
experiments. There are false positive results where drugs that passed
animal testing caused harm in human. For example, thalidomide, Opren
and AZT were tested with positive results in animals with confidence
but was not tested thoroughly in humans. False negatives are less
common, but they do occur. In the 1990s, the development of protease
inhibitors, a class of AIDS drugs, was delayed for four years because
they killed laboratory dogs and rats (12).
Humans differ from other animals in genetics and evolutionary history;
as a result many human diseases that affect humans but not animals.
Alternatives methods such as modeling and stem cell research can be
used in place of the use of animals. The paradigm of the animal model
in science is so entrenched in our research methods that it may well
have
erected an obstacle in further seeking alternatives.
4.1. Rights versus Welfare
The rights-versus-welfare argument aims to limit the scope of the
overall inference to either a deontological or utilitarian approach.
The argument that an individual possesses inherent rights is
deontological in nature; whereas the idea that an individual does not
have inherent rights even though we are obligated to respect their
welfare, is utilitarian in approach. This argument is depicted in
figure 5.
Utilitarian ethics in its many forms requires that we consider the
preference of all parties that are affected by the act, including the
parties who commit the immoral, or evil, act. This premise is
inconsistent
with our moral value and legal standards. We may recognize the inherent
rights of a criminal but we do not take their preferences into account
in making moral and legal judgments, and in deciding on a punishment. I
conclude that the utilitarian approach is unsatisfactory as the basis
of in reaching my position on animal experimentation.
Our value system recognizes individual rights as a protection against
the pressure of public interest, which in direct conflict with
utilitarian ethics. Because of this conflict, we must choose the
approach that is in best agreement with our value system. Therefore, we
are compelled to recognize the overriding importance of the inherent
rights of an individual over public interest. Hereafter the respect for
inherent rights forms a basis for our arguments.
4.2. Rights and Protection
Before we go any further, I shall establish the correlation between
inherent rights and the protection from use in experimentation. If
animals are determined to have inherent rights, it must not be used as
means for our end. For example, Carl Cohen embraces this view; however
he concluded that animals do not, and cannot, have rights and therefore
can be used in experimentation (7).
Inherent rights, as characterized earlier, includes the right of
physical security, and the right of not being used merely as means. The
second premise is my assertion that the use of an individual, whether
it is a human or an animal, involves the violation of life, bodily
integrity, which leads to pain and suffering, and the denial of freedom
from
confinement. From
these premises, I conclude that the possession of inherent rights is
sufficient for protection from use in experiments, particularly those
that violates individual physical security. Research based on the
observation of an individual’s behavior in a natural setting;
for example, do not violate its inherent rights.
Hereafter, if we determined that animals have inherent rights, then
they must not be used as instrument of experimentation.
4.3. Rights and Obligation
For the purpose this argument, I define moral obligation as a demand of
conscience, and duties as binding obligations. A direct duty to an
individual is a binding obligation to individual, whereas an indirect
duty is a binding obligation to a third party who has an interest in
the individual. For example, if you have a direct duty to an animal,
you must respect the animal’s interest or, if it is
determined to possess rights, its rights. On the other hand, if your
duty is indirect, you must respect the interest of the owner of the
animal, but not necessarily the interests of the animal. In this
rights-and-obligation argument, I shall determine whether we owe a duty
to protect animals; and if we do, whether the duty is direct or
indirect. If our duty, which is binding, is direct, then it is my
contention that animals have some rights, although not necessarily
inherent rights. This argument is depicted in figure 6.
First, according to our community standards, we have a moral obligation
to protect animals. Although some thinkers believe that obligation
correlates to rights (4), I am not convinced that it
must be so. So on
the basis of moral obligations alone, humans do not necessarily owe a
duty to animals; humans may respect the welfare but not necessarily the
rights of animals. Second, as an application of our community
standards, we are legally obligated to protect animals; legal
obligation is binding and thus imposes on humans a duty to animals.
Third, a binding duty confers some rights to animals, but the rights
are not necessarily inherent. Fourth, the legal status of animals is
property. Our value system imposes an indirect duty for us to respect
others’ properties. These premises lead to the conclusion
that humans owe indirect, but not necessarily direct, duties to animals.
Another conclusion can be drawn from this argument. Because the social
as well as legal status of animals is property and, according to our
value system, an individual with inherent rights cannot be property, I
conclude that this inconsistency follows that if animals are determined
to have inherent rights, their property status must be abandoned.
4.4. The Able-to-Assert
Argument
At this point I have established that if animals are determined to have
inherent rights, their use for experimentation must cease. Here I
shall consider one of the arguments that are frequently used by
animal-use advocates to exclude animals from having rights. As depicted
in figure 7,
it states that in order for an individual to possess rights, it must be
able to assert it. We call the individual a moral agent. Conversely, the
inability to assert
rights is a sufficient criterion to deny an individual its rights.
However not all human can assert rights, they include infants and those
with severe mental deficiency, whom we call moral patients. Our value system
recognizes inherent rights of all humans, which is inconsistent with
the premise. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this argument
is that it is invalid. Similar premises include the ability to
comprehend rights, which can be invalidated with the same logic.
4.5. The Kind
Argument
If the inability to assert rights is an invalid criterion in denying
rights for animals, then is the membership of a kind that can assert
rights a valid criterion? The argument is depicted in figure 8
as follows:
4.6. The Kinship
Argument
Now that the membership of a kind is an invalid criterion, is
membership in a community a valid criterion? That is, are humans
morally entitled to treatment animals differently based only the
species membership alone. The kinship argument, as depicted in figure 9,
is the basis for racism, sexism and other discriminatory practices
based on group membership. According to the principle of equal
considerations, group membership alone is not a relevant criterion; we
must choose a valid criterion with a basis relevant to the issue at
hand.
4.7. Criteria Based on Relevant Attributes
Here I shall choose one or more attributes common between humans and
animals that are relevant and sufficient for the issue at hand, which
is the use in experimentation. At this point there are two avenues
which lead to the contention that animals must be protected from use in
experimentation. We may choose an attribute that is relevant for the
possession of inherent rights, or we may choose one that is relevant to
the issue at hand, which is animal experiment. The potential attributes
are:
I reject items 1 to 5 as relevant attributes; the reasons for some of them were discussed earlier. Items 6 to 9 are valid possibilities; however some of them are controversial while others are new concepts that are generally unknown to our community. Items 10 to 12, the inclination for life, susceptibility to pain and suffering and aversion to confinement are attributes that are both commonly accepted and relevant to being used in experimentation. As discussed earlier, these attributes make up the basic interest of physical security for animal, human and nonhuman.
4.8. Equality
Here I choose the susceptibility to suffering as a relevant attribute
for the argument; inclination for life and aversion to confinement are
equally relevant attributes depending on the experiment performed.
Based on the principle of equal consideration alone, and without the determination of inherent rights for animals, I conclude that animals must not be used as instrument of experimentation.
4.9. Inherent Rights
Although I have reach an ethical position using the principle of equal
consideration as a premise, there are advantages in determining the
rights status of animals. The principle of equal consideration requires
that we choose a relevant criterion to determine the validity of a
discriminating treatment. The possession of inherent rights, on the
other hand, guarantees that an individual must not be used as means to
the end of the public. We have established that:
4.10. Practical Questions
Although I have determined that animal experimentation is morally
wrong, there are practical questions that must be answered. That is,
are its benefits or harm to humans sufficient reasons in justifying or
rejecting animal-use?
First I shall take the utilitarian approach. According to the premises,
animal experimentation can both benefit and harm humans. Some benefits
by themselves are not sufficient to justify animal experimentation,
just as some harm by itself are not sufficient to reject it.
Utilitarian ethics requires that they be weighed as part of the scheme
in making moral judgments. However the result derived from this method
is irrelevant because, according to our earlier conclusion, inherent
rights of animals are overriding.
This leaves us with the deontological approach and, according to such
approach, public benefit and public harm to the public are not
necessary as criteria.
5.
Conclusion
5.1. Is Animal Experimentation Justified?
I have arrived at a position base on deontological libertarian ethics;
that is, animals have at least inherent rights, which is a negative
right: the right to be left alone. As derived from our community
standards, animals have inherent rights and therefore it is morally
wrong to use animals as instruments of experimentation. However, their
possession of inherent rights is not a necessary criterion to reject
their use in experiments; the principle of equal considerations is a
sufficient premise. On the other hand, there is value in the possession
of inherent rights; it guarantees protection against interests of
humans, whereas the principle of equal protection requires
determination of relevant criteria in a case by case basis.
I also conclude that the property status of animals is inconsistent
with their possession of inherent rights and therefore it must be
abandoned.
5.2. Justifications for the Use of Animals in Research
Now that we have concluded that animal experimentation has no ethical
basis, then under what basis do we, in practice, justifies it? One of
the reasons is
self-interest. Such interest is not necessarily a mere preference but
could be crucial to the welfare of human. For example, you or your
child may need an organ transplant and the only way to get it is for
another person to die. Although it is immoral to wish death on another
person, it is understandable under the circumstances. Our value system
forbids taking the life of one person to save another person; in fact,
it forbids the taking of one life to save ten others, for example.
According to our deontologically based community standards, if an
action is determined to be wrong, it must not be allowed.
Another reason is convenience, animals are readily available and they
are our property. However, we can easily reject this justification with
the same argument as above. Furthermore, if animals have rights,
convenience is not a justification because a right is a safeguard of an
individual against the pressures of social convenience and general
welfare.
Lastly, tradition is commonly used to justification the use of animals
in general, many court rulings has allowed the customary use of animals
even though it violates the spirit of anti-cruelty laws. It has been
demonstrated historically that traditions and customs are irrelevant
reasons to continue an action that is determined to be unethical.
Again, if the property status of animals is eradicated, this and all
justifications of animal instrumentalization become invalid.
6.
Summary
In the argument to arrive at the position on the use of animals in
research I selected premises based on our community standards. From
that I determined the morally correct approach is deontological, where
inherent rights have overriding importance. Then I invalidated some of
the arguments used to deny inherent rights to animals. Using the
principle of equal consideration, I concluded that use of animals as
instruments of research is morally wrong and that animals possess
inherent rights. Inherent rights are negative rights; so at the minimum
we should leave animals alone. The property status of animals is an
obstacle for humans to respect the
animal rights; it is a moral necessity to abandon such obstacle.
Appendix – Virginia Anti-Cruelty Law
Code
OF
VIRGINIA
TITLE 3.1. AGRICULTURE, HORTICULTURE AND FOOD
CHAPTER 27.4. COMPREHENSIVE ANIMAL LAWS.
ARTICLE 6. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS.
§ 3.1-796.122. Cruelty to animals; penalty
A. Any person who (i) overrides, overdrives, overloads, tortures, ill-treats, abandons, willfully inflicts inhumane injury or pain not connected with bona fide scientific or medical experimentation, or cruelly or unnecessarily beats, maims, mutilates, or kills any animal, whether belonging to himself or another; (ii) deprives any animal of necessary food, drink, shelter or emergency veterinary treatment; (iii) sores any equine for any purpose or administers drugs or medications to alter or mask such soring for the purpose of sale, show, or exhibition of any kind, unless such administration of drugs or medications is within the context of a veterinary client-patient relationship and solely for therapeutic purposes; (iv) willfully sets on foot, instigates, engages in, or in any way furthers any act of cruelty to any animal; (v) carries or causes to be carried in or upon any vehicle, vessel or otherwise any animal in a cruel, brutal, or inhumane manner, so as to produce torture or unnecessary suffering; or (vi) causes any of the above things, or being the owner of such animal permits such acts to be done by another, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
B. Any person who (i) tortures, willfully inflicts inhumane injury or pain not connected with bona fide scientific or medical experimentation, or cruelly and unnecessarily beats, maims, mutilates or kills any animal whether belonging to himself or another; (ii) sores any equine for any purpose or administers drugs or medications to alter or mask such soring for the purpose of sale, show, or exhibit of any kind, unless such administration of drugs or medications is under the supervision of a licensed veterinarian and solely for therapeutic purposes; (iii) instigates, engages in, or in any way furthers any act of cruelty to any animal set forth in clause (i); or (iv) causes any of the actions described in clauses (i) through (iii), or being the owner of such animal permits such acts to be done by another; and has been within five years convicted of a violation of this subsection or subsection A, shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony if the current violation or any previous violation of this subsection or subsection A resulted in the death of an animal or the euthanasia of an animal based on the recommendation of a licensed veterinarian upon determination that such euthanasia was necessary due to the condition of the animal, and such condition was a direct result of a violation of this subsection or subsection A.
C. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the dehorning of cattle.
D. For the purposes of this section and §§ 3.1-796.111, 3.1-796.113, 3.1-796.114, 3.1-796.115, and 3.1-796.125, the word animal shall be construed to include birds and fowl.
E. This section shall not prohibit authorized wildlife management activities or hunting, fishing or trapping as regulated under other titles of the Code of Virginia, including, but not limited to Title 29.1, or to farming activities as provided under this title or regulations promulgated thereto.
F. In addition to the penalties provided in subsection A, the court may, in its discretion, require any person convicted of a violation of subsection A to attend an anger management or other appropriate treatment program or obtain psychiatric or psychological counseling. The court may impose the costs of such a program or counseling upon the person convicted.
G. It is unlawful for any person to kill a domestic dog or cat for the purpose of obtaining the hide, fur or pelt of the dog or cat. A violation of this subsection shall constitute a Class 1 misdemeanor. A second or subsequent violation of this subsection shall constitute a Class 6 felony.
H. Any person who (i) tortures, willfully inflicts inhumane injury or pain not connected with bona fide scientific or medical experimentation or cruelly and unnecessarily beats, maims or mutilates any dog or cat that is a companion animal whether belonging to him or another and (ii) as a direct result causes the death of such dog or cat that is a companion animal, or the euthanasia of such animal on the recommendation of a licensed veterinarian upon determination that such euthanasia was necessary due to the condition of the animal, shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. The provisions of this subsection shall not overrule § 3.1-796.93:1 or § 3.1-796.116.
I. Any person convicted of violating this section may be prohibited by the court from possession or ownership of companion animals.
Copyright
© 2005 by
Clayton Fan
